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Workers'  Trust Funds and the Logic of Wage Profiles 
ABSTRACT 
This paper  defines a concept,  a worker's trust fund,  which  is 
useful  in analyzing optimal age-earnings profiles.  The trust fund 
represents what a worker loses if dismissed from a job for shirking. 
In considering whether to work or shirk, a worker weighs the 
potential loss due to forfeiture of the trust fund if caught shirking 
against the benefits from reduced effort.  This concept is used  to 
show that the implicit bonding in upward sloping age—earnings 
profiles  is not a perfect substitute for an explicit upfront 
performance bond  (or employment fee).  It is also shown that the 
second—best optimal earnings profile in the absence of an upfront 
employment fee pays total compensation in excess of market clearing 
in a  variety of stylized cases. 
George A. Akerlof  Lawrence F. Katz 
Department of Economics  Department of Economics 
University  of California  Harvard University 
Berkeley, CA  94720  Cambridge, MA 02138 I  •  INTRODUCTION 
This paper  concerns  the logic of age-earnings  profiles  and worker 
incentives.  Alternative  wage profiles  yield different  incentives in 
principal-agent  models with the employer  as principal  and the 
employee as agent.  This paper introduces the concept  of workers' 
trust funds  (as will be explained presently)  and shows  the relevance 
of this concept in analyzing  a standard  efficiency wage  model. 
In the most  popular efficiency wage  model,  firms find it 
profitable to pay wages above market clearing to provide workers with 
ef  fort incentjves)  These models have been criticized  because 
contracts  in which workers pay employment  fees  (alternatively called 
upfront bonds) would eliminate involuntary unemployment  (Carmichael, 
1985).  The threat of forfeiting the bond  generates  work incentives 
allowing the total terms of the equilibrium labor contract to adjust 
to clear  the labor market.  Such upfront bonds are rarely observed; 
but, it has been argued that contracts with upward sloping earnings 
profiles can act as a perfect substitute for contracts with explicit 
upfront bonds.  Thus, the argument continues, the absence of upfront 
bonds is not a sign of the  failure of market clearing. 
To test the logic of the preceding argument, we assume that 
contracts cannot utilize upfront bonds.  It will be seen that the 
second—best contract with an upward sloping wage  profile cannot be a 
perfect substitute  for the first-best contract with  an upfront bond. 
Consider  the work—shirk  decision of a worker facing an upward sloping 
(but market clearing)  compensation profile.  This  worker can be 
viewed as having  a trust  of deferred wages and accrued interest 
which is maintained  by the firm.  This  trust fund will be forfeited if the worker is caught shirking  and dismissed.  In a continuous tine 
setting, the value of this trust fund to a risk neutral worker  at 
time T (where time 0 is the start of the contract)  is 
*  r(T—t) 
(1)  1  (w  (t)  - w(t))  e  dt 
Jo 
* 
where  (w (t)  w(t))  is the difference between  the worker's 
opportunity cost and current wage w(t) at t, and where  r is the 
interest rate.  This  trust  fund is the accumulated value  of the 
worker's deferred  wages including accumulated interest. 
The worker  in deciding whether to work  or shirk  compares  the 
expected  loss if caught shirking to the expected  gain from shirking. 
Suppose that a worker who shirks for a short interval of length dt 
will be caught and lose his trust fund with  probability  p dt, and let 
v dt be the monetary  value  to the worker of shirking  for such an 
interval.  In this case, the worker will work at time T if 
rT  *  r(T-t' 
(2)  p  dt  [  (w  (t) — w(t))  e  at  ] ￿  v at. 
Jo 
In  other words, if the expected  cost of shirking, the probability  of 
being caught  (p dt)  times the value of the trust fund forfeited  (the 
term in brackets  in  (2)),  is at least as great as the expected  gain 
from shirking, v dt, he will work,  Rearranging  terms, one can easily 
verify that the worker will work  only if the value of his trust fund 
exceeds (or equals) v/p.  Note that v/p is a stock, and not a flow. 
(To induce the worker  to work for an instant of length dt, he must 
incur a loss if caught shirking which exceeds the ratio of the gain 3 
from shirking to the probability  of being caught shirking.  The gain 
from shirking for an instant of length dt (v dt) and the probability 
of being  caught shirking  (p dt) are both  proportional  to dt and 
small.  The ratio of these two quantities, which is the size of the 
loss necessary to induce the worker  not to shirk,  is an order  of 
magnitude  larger than  either since the dt's cancel in the ratio.) 
The trust fund concept can be used to explain why market 
clearing contracts that use upfront bonds and those  that use only 
implicit bonds through deferred payments  are not perfect  substitutes. 
The risk  neutral worker  who posts an upfront performance bond  of v/p 
or larger  (and who is paid his opportunity cost throughout his job 
tenure) will never shirk. However,  with a market clearing 
compensation package based  on implicit bonding,  no matter how low the 
(nonnegative) wage paid to the worker early in his job tenure, it 
will take some finite time before the accumulated trust fund has 
reached the stock level v/p.  (There is a bound  on how fast this 
trust  fund can accumulate  if there can be no  payments from  the 
worker  to the firm).  And, as a result, with implicit bonds and a 
market  clearing wage package,  there is some period  of time before the 
trust fund accumulates sufficiently to induce the worker  not to 
shirk.  During that time  the worker will shirk rather than  work.  In 
other words,  if a firm offers an employment package  that does not 
require an upfront bond and is no better than a worker's  opportunity 
costs, a worker  will surely shirk at the beginning  of his  (or her) 
career: there is no capital loss to the worker  from losing the job, 
but there is a gain due to the smaller effort in shirking. 4 
We have  thus seen the flaw in the commonly held belief  that 
market clearing  upward sloping wage profiles,  in the absence of 
explicit upfront  bonding,  can act as an incentive against shirking 
throughout  a worker's  career,  While such deferred  payments  can 
prevent workers  from shirking  late in their careers,  they do not 
prevent workers  from shirking early in their  careers.2  It remains, 
however,  to show that paying a premium above market clearing  wages 
will be a cheaper way to hire effective  labor units than paying 
market clearing wage levels with  workers shirking early in their 
careers,  Such a proposition  is not true in general.  But with a 
rather wide  variety  of productivity patterns, the cost of shirking by 
workers early in their careers with market clearing wage schedules 
will be greater than the cost of paying wage  premia  in excess of 
market clearing which  prevent workers from shirking entirely. 
The next section constructs a simple model to illustrate why 
labor markets fail to clear in the absence of employment  fees even in 
markets where firms are trustworthy.  In this model, workers have 
discretion over their own effort and  firms have imperfect abilities 
to monitor  shirking.  The model is the continuous  time analogue  of 
the Becker-Stigler  bonding model  (Becker and Stigler,  1974) and is 
closely related  to the Shapiro-Stiglitz efficiency wage  model 
(Shapiro and Stiglitz, l984).  Relative to Becker and Stigler, we 
add one restriction; we do not permit upfront performance bonds  (or 
entrance  fees) to be paid by a worker at the beginning  of a labor 
contract.  Relative  to Shapiro and Stiglitz, we model workers  with 
finite horizons (rather than infinite horizons),  and, assume S 
employers  are honest and can commit not to falsely claim nalfeasance 
and dismiss a  nonshirking worker. 
This  paper  thus presents a synthesis between  bonding models  and 
efficiency wage  models.  When  the models are set up symmetrically,  it 
turns out that the difference between  the two models  lies in the 
assumed presence or absence of upfront bonds.4 
II.  BASIC MODEL 
A.  The Modal's Assumptions 
The following assumptions fully describe  the model. 
Time 
1.  A  worker has a work career beginning at time 0 and ending at 
time n. 
2.  Time is continuous in the model. 
The Work-Shirk  Decision and its Consequences 
3.  At each point of his career, the worker has a decision 
whether to work or to shirk.  The worker makes this decision  at each 
point of tine to maximize  expected lifetime utility. 
4.  A worker  who shirks will supply 0 units of effective  labor 
to the firm.  A worker who works  will supply e* units of effective 
labor to the firm.5 
5.  e* is constant throughout the worker's career. 
6.  The monetary value of shirking to the worker  for the short 
length of time  dt  is  v dt. 
The Monitoring  Process and Worker Djscthline/ 
Finn Honesty in Dismissal 6 
7.  A worker who shirks for the period  dt  is detected  by the 
firm with probability  p dt, 
8.  A  delay cannot occur between observation of shirking  and a 
worker's  consequent dismissal. 
9.  Firms are totally honest in their dismissals.  Workers  are 
never dismissed  unless caught shirking. 
Alternative  Opportunities  for Workers 
10.  A  worker has outside opportunities which  pay a constant 
wage  w,  for  0  t  n,  It is convenient  to think  of these 
alternative opportunities  as the secondary labor market. 
11.  Upon leaving the firm at t, the worker can immediately earn 
* 
w  (t). 
Workers' and Firms' Utilities  and Discount Rates 
12.  Both firms and workers are risk  neutral. 
13.  Both  workers and firms have a  zero  rate of discount. 
14.  Workers  are homogeneous. 
Restrictions on Compensation Schedules 
15.  Workers  do not pay firms an explicit bond or fee upon 
joining the firm.  In other words, there are no net payments  by 
workers to firms. 
8.  Derivation  of the ODtimal waQe Path 
The  firm in this model wishes to purchase  labor efficiency  units 
at minimum  unit cost.  We shall show that the cost  minimizing  wage 
package involves  total payments whose sum is w*n + v/p.  The 
alternative opportunities  (which are  freely available to a worker) 
pay a lifetime total of  wn.  Thus, total remuneration  from the cost 7 
minimizing package  is in excess of the total remuneration  in the 
secondary  labor market by  v/p. 
It is intuitive that the firm  will lose nothing by paying all of 
the worker's  remuneration at the worker's  retirement date.  This  way 
the firm's expenditure on worker remuneration will do the most  work 
in inducing workers not to shirk.  At each point in his career, the 
worker has the inducement not to shirk of the payment at the end of 
his career which is only received  if he is never caught shirking. 
Given  that we need only consider  compensation schemes in which 
all payments  are made at the end of the worker's  career, it is only 
necessary  to discover the optimal total remuneration  over the 
worker's  lifetime.  The worker must  be paid at least  wn at the end 
of his career in order to be induced to join the firm.  Suppose that 
*  the worker  is paid  w  n + x.  What  is the optimum value of the 
premium  (x) paid  to the worker  above the market—clearing  wage  stream 
whose lifetime value is  w*n? 
•  •  •  *  Given that the firm is paying the worker  w n + x  at the end, 
we can view the worker's  choice problem  in the following way. 
Suppose a worker has not previously been caught shirking at tine  t. 
He may choose to shirk over the  interval  t  to  t + dt.  This policy 
has the gain  v  dt  due to the added utility from shirking.  However, 
if the worker  gets caught shirking,  his total compensation will be 
w*(n  — t)  from  future earnings  in the secondary  sector rather  than 
the  w1'n  + x  available at his firm for someone never caught 
shirking.  Consequently,  if the worker  plans to work from time t + dt 8 
to n, his potential  gain from shirking  is  v dt,  and his potential 
loss is 
*  * 
(3)  p dt((w n + x)  — w  (n — t)) 
which simplifies to  p dt(w*t + x).6  At the point T where the worker 
is just at the margin between  working and shirking, we have 
* 
(4)  p dt(w T + x)  = V  dt. 
At later times, it will be more  costly for the worker to be caught 
shirking, and therefore the worker will work.  And at earlier times 
it is less costly to be caught shirking and therefore  the worker  will 
shirk. 
As described above, equation  (4)  suggests the simple analogy of 
the trust fund which underlies much of the logic of our argument.  We 
can pretend that the firm sets up a trust fund for its workers,  It 
puts up x in the beginning when  the worker is initially hired and 
later puts money into the trust fund at rate wi'.  At each point  in 
time t, the worker must decide whether to shirk, with  the  ill 
consequence that he may be caught with probability  p  dt  and give up 
the accumulated trust fund of amount  u*t + x.  The potential  gain 
from shirking is v  dt.  consequently the worker  is just indifferent 
between working and shirking at time T  for which 
(5)  p  dt {w*Tx  + x]  V  dt. 
What is the optimal value  of x given that T  obeys  (5)?  Equation  (5) 
yields the value  of T  for each  x, 9 
*  =  max((v/p  - x)/w  ,  0). 
The firm's probleni  is to choose x  to minimize unit labor costs which 
are given  by 
*  *  wn+X  wn+x 
*  V  *  * 
(n  — T)e  (n — [(— 
—  x)/w  J)e 
over the range  0  x < v/p.  It is easily shown that expression  (7) 
is minimized  over this range if  x = v/p,  since the derivative  of  (7) 
with  respect to  x  is negative  for all  x  in the range  0  x  I 
v/p. 
As a result, the optimal  (cost minimizing)  wage package will pay 
a premium  x = v/p.  This implies  TX 
= 0.  There is never any 
shirking  under the optimal compensation profile and the firm makes 
total career payments of  v/p  in excess of the market. 
Am explanation  for this solution proceeds  as follows.  For a 
worker  to work, at the last instant worked he or she must 
receive  a surplus of at least  v/p.  This  v/p  constitutes a fixed 
cost to the firm.  At all previous  moments worked, the worker must 
also have  a surplus of at least  v/p, so that the firm pays a minimum 
to the worker  of  u*tw  + v/p  for working  a length of time  t.  By 
paying  w*n + v/p  at the end of the 
worker's  career, the firm spreads the fixed cost  v/p  over the 
maximum working time  (the worker's whole career n) and therefore  unit 
labor cost is minimized.7 10 
It has been seen that in the case without discounting  that a 
finn which minimizes  its unit labor costs in the presence  of a 
shirking problem  and without the ability to collect upfront 
employment  fees from workers will pay a  career wage that exceeds the 
alternative career earnings  available to workers  in the secondary 
sector by  v/p.  Upward sloping wage profiles cannot  fully substitute 
for explicit  employment fees in such a  model.  Only after the trust 
fund has an accumulated value  v/p  will the worker stop shirking. 
And  if Hbonding! occurs by workers'  initial receipt of wages below 
the secondary  sector level, it takes too long for the worker  to stop 
shirking  if total lifetime wages paid  out are at the market  clearing 
level.  It is better instead for the f  inn to pay an efficiency wage 
premium of  v/p  in excess of market clearing at the end of the 
worker's  career and prevent shirking altogether. 
Remark: 
The model above has only one type of job for workers  in the 
primary  sector.  If jobs differ according to the ease of monitoring, 
a firm's optimal strategy  is to assign younger workers (recent hires) 
to more  easily  monitored  jobs.  Indeed, if there are enough 
productive jobs with costless monitoring, the equilibrium  contract 
will be market  clearing with  workers placed in jobs with  no shirking 
potential  early in their  careers and moved to more responsible  jobs 
once their  trust  funds have  built up sufficiently.8 
III.  XT!N8IONB  0? TH  RDI4ENTARY I4ODEL 
A longer paper (Akerlof and Katz  (1987)) explores  in some detail 
each of seven  extensions of the rudimentary model of the previous 11 
section.  The logic of each of these extensions  conforms to the 
analysis  of the previous section.  Here we will only give a brief 
summary of these extensions. 
1.  Positive  Discount Rates,  In the previous model the discount 
rate is zero.  Adding  a positive  discount rate does not alter  the 
previous  result regarding the desirability of wage premia.  The 
analysis with positive discount  rates is exactly analogous to the 
analysis with zero discount  rates. 
2.  Growing Worker Productivity.  In the rudimentary model 
workers  have constant productivity.  If workers have low productivity 
in the early part of their careers then  it does not much matter  to 
firms  if they shirk in that part of their  careers.  As a  consequence, 
if worker  productivity  is growing sufficiently fast over workers' 
careers,  firms' best strategy will let workers shirk in the early 
part of their  careers while their trust funds are building  up, and it 
will not be optimal to pay a wage premium. 
3.  Endooenous  Productivity Gains.  The argument  of the 
preceding paragraph  relating productivity gains and wage  premia 
assumes, however,  that working workers and shirking  workers are alike 
in their productivity  gains.  According to a  more natural assumption 
workers only have increasing productivity  insofar as they are not 
shirking.  In this case it is particularly  important to avoid 
shirking  early in workers' careers,  and it can be shown that wage 
premia are again the second—best optimal policy. 12 
4.  Positive Output  by Shirkin  Workers.  In the rudimentary 
model shirking workers produced  zero output,  Kevin 14. Murphy  has 
suggested  a change in our model which permits workers to accumulate 
an implicit bond in the form  of output even if explicit  upfront bonds 
are prohibited.  The modification  is to suppose that shirking workers 
supply e0 efficiency units  where e0 
is strictly  positive  (rather than 
zero as assumed in our basic  model).  If the work horizon (n)  is 
sufficiently long, in the profit maximizing contract  firms will pay 
* 
workers  a zero wage  until retirement and a payment of nw  at 
retirement,  A  worker will shirk producing effort a0 until the value 
of his or her trust fund reaches v/p.  Thereafter  the worker  will 
work  producing effort e*,  I  this case, the firm will  minimize  labor 
costs by allowing workers to shirk  early in their  careers and 
dissipating all worker rents with  a market clearing compensation 
package.  Such  solutions with workers receiving market clearing 
compensation packages and shirking early  in their careers are 
sensitive to our extreme assumption that  workers are willing  to 
accept zero wages  at the beginning of their careers provided  lifetime 
remuneration is sufficient.  If workers must  be paid at each instant 
a wage  higher than the shirking  productivity level e0,  a trust fund 
of v/p can never  be accumulated by shirking workers.  Furthermore, 
since many forms of shirking may cause large damages to firms  (e.g., 
the examples discussed  in Mars (1982)), the assumption  that shirking 
workers produce e0 less than or equal to zero may not be unrealistic. 
Other  reasons for efficiency  wages such  as the effect of higher  wages 13 
in facilitating recruiting and reducing turnover  are added  reasons 
why firms will not dissipate  all ex-ante rents in this fashion. 
5.  Higher Discount Rates for Workers Than Firms.  In the 
rudimentary model workers and firms have the sane discount  rate.  If 
workers have a higher discount rate than  firms, the second best 
optimal policy will not pay workers at the end of the contract, but 
rather pay a steady stream of wages over their working  career with a 
lump sum payment at the end.9  This strengthens the argument  in favor 
of wage premia at retirement, because the trust fund builds up more 
slowly when wages are being paid  out.  Consequently,  in the absence 
of wage premia paid to workers at retirement workers'  relative myopia 
makes the period of shirking longer.  Thus higher discount  rates for 
workers  than firms increase the unit cost of effective  labor when no 
wage premia are paid and as a result, make it relatively  more 
advantageous to pay wage premia. 
6.  Endogenous Monitoring. The rudimentary model assumed that 
the probability of catching a  worker shirking in the interval  t  to 
t + dt  was fixed at  p dt.  It is surprisingly easy to extend the 
model to the case where the probability of catching  the working 
shirking  is proportional  to the monitoring cost.  An optimal time 
dependent path for  p  can then be derived.  Workers  late in their 
careers, who have more  to lose, will be monitored  less closely. 
Again  wage premia will be paid. 
7.  Stigma and Moving Costs.  If workers'  employment histories 
can be observed by potential  employers, workers fired for shirking 14 
say be stigmatized  and have a more difficult time gaining 
reemployment or be offered reduced wages.  They  may also incur moving 
costs.  If the cost of stigma  (or moving costs) is denoted  s, the 
worker  will begin working  when  the value of his trust fund exceeds 
v/p  s.  If s exceeds v/p1 market clearing  wages will  be paid. If a 
is less than v/p, the presence of this stigma  (or moving  costs) will 
not affect the decision  whether to pay wages in excess of market 
clearing  or to let workers shirk until their  trust funds are 
sufficiently large to induce working. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
A  method  has been  proposed  to analyze dynamic wage  paths in the 
second—best optimal case where for some reason or other workers 
cannot or will not post upfront performance bonds or pay employment 
fees to gain jobs.  Surprisingly,  in a  wide variety of cases  these 
second-best contracts without performance bonds involve wage  premia 
above the market clearing  level of wages. 
Bonding models,  such as in Becker and Stigler  (1974), make  the 
unrealistic prediction that firms utilize employment  fees or upfront 
bonds to clear the labor market. Efficiency wage  models with 
untrustworthy  firms and infinitely lived workers,  such as in Shapiro 
and Stiglitz  (1984) and Bulow and Summers (1986), yield  the 
counterfactual prediction  that firms cannot utilize deferred 
compensation mechanisms.  On the other hand, the model  analyzed  in 
this paper matches the observation that firms do not make  workers 
post upfront bonds  but do utilize pensions and other deferred payment 
schemes. 15 
Finally, we emphasize  the justification  for our assumption of 
the absence of upfront bonds and employment  fees.  We have  made this 
assumption  to explore the importance of upfront bonds  for market 
clearing when  worker  moral hazard problems are present.  This paper 
has demonstrated the  importance of this assumption: in the absence of 
upfront bonds, simple models of work incentives may not yield market 
clearing.  Why?  Because with  narket clearing  compensation  profiles 
workers will shirk until the time when the value of their trust fund 
equals v/p.  With many plausible  career productivity  patterns,  firns 
will find it less costly to prevent shirking throughout a  worker's 
career by paying a premium v/p above the market clearing  level than 
to suffer the lower output generated by workers shirking early  in 
their job tenures. 16 
FOOTNOTES 
1.  Models  of this type have recently been examined  by Bowles (1985), 
Bulow and Summers  (1986), Calvo  (1985),  Eaton and White  (1983), 
Shapiro and Stiglitz  (1984), Stoft (1982) and others.  Yellen  (1984) 
and Katz  (1986) provide surveys of alternative efficiency wage 
models.  Mars  (1982) presents  numerous examples of the importance of 
worker  discretion  and the  limited ability of firms to monitor worker 
behavior. 
2.  Market  clearing packages  without upfront  fees may provide 
sufficient  incentive to prevent workers from shirking throughout 
their careers if there are substantial costs associated with the 
stigma of being fired for shirking or if there are substantial costs 
to moving between jobs.  The conditions under which stigma or moving 
costs eliminate  the need for wage premia are discussed  in section 
III, 
3. See Akerlof and Katz  (1987)  for a detailed comparison between  the 
model developed  in this paper and the bonding model of Lazear  (1981) 
4.  Examination of contracts without upfront bonds may be 
particularly  relevant since practical considerations  may limit the 
use of such devices.  Bulow and Summers (1986), Dickens, Katz, Lang 
and Summers  (1987), and Shapiro and Stiglitz  (1984) provide detailed 
discussions  of reasons why firms may be limited in their  ability to 
get workers to post  performance bonds. 
5. We  assume that firms' production functions are of the form 
fLe n)  where  n  is the number of laborers who are supplying effort 
e  .  A worker  who supplies  0 labor has no effect on output.  It is 
said that a worker who shirks supplies 0 units  of effective  labor 
while a worker  who works supplies  e  units of effective labor. 
6.  If the firm could  hide its knowledge of having  detected  a worker 
shirking and wait  till n before dismissing a worker  for a shirking 
offense committed at , the worker's potential  loss from shirking  at 
t is instead  p dt (w n  + x)  since a worker dismissed  at n  will 
attain no outside earnings.  In this case, the firm's optimal 
strategy  is to hide its knowledge of having caught a worker  shirking 
and wait  till just prior to the worker's  retirement date to fire the 
worker.  If the worker knows that he or she has been caught shirking 
this strategy has no use.  At that point, the worker will seek other 
employment.  Also, the delayed informing of the worker that he or she 
has been caught shirking  and in danger of disciplinary action may 
leave a firm open  to an unjust dismissal suit in some U.S. states and 
would not be permissible under  the dismissal  rules in many European 
countries. 
7.  Hutchens  (1986) shows in a shirking model in which workers are 
assumed to be able to post upfront bonds that the specter of firm 17 
cheating  on delayed payments  introduces a form of fixed costs into 
the  employment  relationship.  Since a firm entails these fixed costs 
each time it hires  a new worker, firms prefer to hire young workers 
with long potential tenures.  Hutchens  argues that  firms with 
reputations  for honesty do not face these fixed costs and should be 
indifferent  between hiring young and old workers.  In contrast,  our 
model shows that even honest firms face the fixed costs of generating 
enough surplus to provide work incentives if upfront  bonds are not 
possible. 
8.  Furthermore,  if primary sector firms are paying  above market 
clearing  wages because of monitoring difficulties,  there  is an 
incentive for primary sector firms to merge with  secondary  sector 
firms.  In this case, workers would  be positioned  in the secondary 
sector jobs that have  little potential for shirking  early in their 
careers and optimal deferred payment  schemes could potentially  be 
market clearing.  The importance of job specific human  capital 
accumulation  may limit the usefulness of such measures. 
9.  The generalized version of different discount  rates has been 
analyzed  by Kuhn  (1986). 18 
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